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war death in 1914-1918, at least a score (a total of some 20,000,000) perished in 1939-1945. Material losses in
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—3£Ji&.^ _^ 6avy load for statesmen The collapse of Germany, Italy, Japan^  an3~~thS 11" """ 
lesser allies left a power vacuum, temporarily filled by the 
armies of occupation. Military losses were half again as high 
as in World War I. Even greater was the difference in civilian 
losses« For every civilian who died a war death in 1914-1918, 
at least a score (a total of some 20 ,,Q00 ,.QOQ) perished in 1939-
194&. Material losses in housing—aad productive capaci-tv^ were staggering—"""™''" 
Given the magnitude of the task, the success of physical 
reconstruction, particularly in Japan, Russia, and Western 
Europe, was striking. In Europe prewar production was eaualed 
fey_194a^-Both there ana~Tn~TTaFn[JnrtHd~lJTate"s~p^^^ real 
income reached new heights. Less encouraging was the continued 
relative decline of Western European economy. For example, 
Europe's share of world export trade fell from about fifty per 
cent on the eve of World War I to thirty-five per cent for 1948-
1950= examj3l£S--X)X--C£mjLtrles whn.dP! tech-
i^que-iox~.xeconstruction was ^  ^ the postwar world * 
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wai-time restrictions on consxunptiQJi^..ax..^jQXt.,£QjQCiS„ 
^o55""'wQt''g~'T'gsla,^^ Udnversely, western Germany, temporarily 
r e e r o n ^ t t i e "  c o s t l y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  h e r  o w n  d e f e n s e ,  r e l i e d  
more on the self-adjusting mechanism of free enterprise. This 
too was the line followed in the United States, whose extensive 
grants for relief and reconstruction were absolutely essential 
for speedy recovery of the v/orld's economy. 
Awareness of the magnitude of postwar problems encouraged 
international cooperation in their solution to a greater extent 
than after World War I. To replace the League of Nations, a 
war casualty, a United Nations Organization was established in 
1945 to facilitate diplomatic, economic, medical, and cultural 
cooperation. The success of the relief work of such organiza­
tions as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis­
tration, and the growing awareness that the narrowly national 
approach was inadequate, led to a remarkably spawning of supra­
national bodies with long-range programs for international eco­
nomic cooperation. For example, the European Coal and Steel 
Community, founded in 1952, assumed some of the characteristics 
of a superstate in its limited but important field in western 
Europe. The European Common Market, which went into effect in 
1959, was only one of the number of efforts to reduce tariff 
barriers, something on the order of the Zollverein. Such devel­
opments led some to hope that nationalism might eventually be 
subordinated to a larger European community. 
Pnl i ti r.a] rajconstruction in_-Eugo»e—sms less revolutionary, 
e^xcept in Germ any and Italy. Democratic rej^blics estaiDiisiied 
in West Germany and Italy survived the difficult years of their 
infancy. In France the Third Republic had fallen with its 
armies in 1940, only to reappear (as the Fourth Republic) after 
the war with her old virtues and vices intact. A Fifth Republic, 
proclaimed in 1958 by the war hero, General Charles de Gaulle 
(1890- ) promised a stronger executive without loss of civil 
liberties. Elsewhere in the West, prewar regimes either con­
tinued or were restored. Nowhere did Nazism or Fascism threaten 
democracy as overt and organized movements. In their prewar 
forms, at least, they failed to outlive their leaders. This 
left Communism as the principal totalitarian competitor of de­
mocracy. Italy, for example, possessed the largest Communist 
party of any non-Communist European country. 
The prewar.. CQii£;ept of the welfare state con­
tinued in the postv/ar,. world. 
one of the Socialist |)art^^ by now generally. reformisi: and 
anti-Communist, whicli were particularly _stron£^_i^jt^„^jaaxa-44a-
war • Thus, in Britain a Labor government 
(1945-1951) nationalized many industries and introduced a non-
contributory health scheme. In other cases, the vehicle was 
one of the new, non-Marxist, democratic, and usually Catholic, 
Christian Democratic parties, as was the case in West Germany. 
The prewar tendency of otherwise conservative parties to adopt 
portions of the welfare state concept also continued. 
XVIII p. 61 
In eastern Europe, politics pursued quite a different pat­
tern. With the Red Army at their elbows, local Communists es­
tablished "peoples democracies" patterned more or less closely 
on the Soviet Union. Only in one state did the Soviet forces 
suffer a serious setback. This was Yugoslavia, where the local 
Coiiimunist party revolted against dictation from Moscow and in­
troduced its own brand of "national communism." 
Soviet policy in eastern Enrnpej often in vinlatinn nf i-n-
ternational agreements, '-gnqoH a * c; 
g^ tTonS" witK:. Thls^ wa^  th^  "co^ j/ar,^ ' In 
self-proTe^ction they and otKeiT Y/estern power's drew together in 
t^e North Atlantic Treaty Organization^(1949y. There was a 
corrci9^eGdi4ig.--4«%cTrsirfx^"fT65 in"^c^ cooperation, as de­
scribed earlier. 
JbcoBLJ:hfi._J[.ir^ t-,--^ ±he^  c^ ^^  war was connected with the coi>-
temporary upsurf!;e of anticoibniaT~^ntiment„ln Africa and the 
lielZEZaSSrjEixI^ Prewar colonial ties and Western jTrestige 
had been irrevocably shattered in World War II. Gone too was 
much of the West!s self-confidence in its mission to guide other 
peoples. Within a decade after the war, Russia's was the only 
colonial empire extant in eastern Asia, In many places nation­
alists allied themselves with Communists, sometimes because they 
shared a common enmity toward the West, sometimes because the 
Soviet experiment promised a shortcut to industrialization and 
the other attributes of greatness. Throughout the world, ob-
frfT 1 nwia^-^oiaBoXy the Chinesg Communists who in 1949, 
afte^^laotic civil strife, gained contxal....Qj their vast and 
pbpul6us"T^ m^ anB""Trom nat ional i st opponents. Beyond their 
fri^tiers they supported fe^ CoBmunis'tsth Kbrea In a 
v/axj agaThst : tSe. U v/hich ended in a 
stalemate and a renev/al of the earlier division of Korea^ C^^ 
former Japanese colony) inta^^^^C^ Shd non-Corimunist states. 
A"~sIirrTar divisimr blicurred in French Indo-China in 1955 when 
France withdrew after a bloody but vain attempt to reassert her 
prewar control in the face of nationalist and Communist opposi­
tion. Some pundits felt that the fate of the Orient for genera­
tions might be decided in India which, granted independence by 
Britain in 1947, was experimenting with ways to combine Western 
democracy v/ith a variety of non-Communist economic systems. 
Lleanwhile, the tide of anticolonialism was running strong in 
Africa, adding Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana, and others to the list 
of independent states. O^ce again, as so often before, citizens 
oC„th,e,.,..world-found themselves iivjte iii "U 
souls. 
